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INTRODUCTION
“International trade policy is no longer primarily concerned with tariffs”
was a common refrain at international economic law conferences just a few years
ago. And for good reason. At the time, it was clear that both trade negotiations
and disputes were increasingly focused on non-tariff barriers to trade, such as
behind-the-border discrimination, and issues like intellectual property
protections and labor and environmental rules. Since the mid-1980s alone, the
global average of most-favored nation (MFN) applied tariffs—the standard rate
WTO members apply to each other—have fallen from over 25% to less than
10%.1 Among OECD countries, that number is less than 5%.2 The decline looks
even starker when compared with data from 1947, the year the GATT was
created. The World Bank estimated that average global tariffs on manufactured
goods in 1947 started at 40%.3
Today, of course, the picture is very different. President Trump has made
tariffs the central issue in international trade policy. Using a wide range of
statutory authority, he has imposed tariffs on $200 billion worth of Chinese
imports, including solar panels and washing machines, as well as on steel and
aluminum from virtually every country in the world. He has also threatened
additional tariffs on a range of other products, including automobiles and auto
parts.
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Joost H.B. Pauwelyn, Andrew T. Guzman & Jennifer A. Hillman, INT’L TRADE LAW 4 (3d
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2.
Id.
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WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1987, at 134-35 (1987); but see Chad P.
Bown & Douglas A. Irwin, The GATT’s Starting Point: Tariff Levels Circa 1947, WORLD BANK (Apr.
2016) (estimating average global tariffs in 1947 at twenty-two percent).
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In this essay, I argue that one reason for the massive deployment of tariff
authority is that the president, like any political officeholder, is beholden to those
who put him in office—and who can keep him there. During his successful 2016
campaign, President Trump promised to bring manufacturing jobs back to the
United States generally, and especially in states like Michigan, Pennsylvania,
Wisconsin, and Ohio that proved decisive in the election.4 President Trump
linked the decline of manufacturing to trade agreements that had reduced trade
barriers, allowing cheap imports to supplant goods made in the United States.
Since taking office, he has used the powers available to him to try to make good
on his promises and reward the constituencies that supported him in the election.
In principle, the government has a wide range of policy instruments at its
disposal to help those regions. An expansion of the Trade Adjustment Assistance
program, which provides financial assistance to workers, farmers, and firms who
have suffered due to trade liberalization, would help President Trump’s target
constituency.5 Similarly, federal subsidies to help new industries, increased
federal investment in primary research and infrastructure, and tax credits for
businesses that relocate to economically ravaged regions would all help bring
jobs back to the heartland.6 Such programs, however, require action—either to
appropriate funds or to change existing law, like the tax code—by a Congress
that is remarkably slow to act these days. Thus, like many presidential
administrations before it, the Trump administration has searched for policies that
advance its goals and that it can implement without Congress.7 The tariff power
is an obvious candidate: Congress, as it turns out, has delegated almost total
control over tariff rates to the president.
The fact that the president has turned to tariffs to effect redistribution
should hardly come as a shock. Tariff reductions since the Second World War
have created an enormous amount of wealth globally, but they have also had
huge distributional impacts that have gone largely unaddressed. During that time,
a bipartisan political consensus emerged that trade policy should maximize
wealth, while distributional issues should be dealt with domestically.8 But
Congress, a deliberative body facing substantial impediments to action, has
4.
Todd Spangler, The Rust Belt Gave Trump Victory, Now They Want Jobs in Return, USA
TODAY (Jan. 18, 2017), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2017/01/18/rust-belt-votersdonald-trump/96670922/.
5.
For a description of the Trade Adjustment Assistance program, see Frank J. Garcia &
Timothy Meyer, Restoring Trade’s Social Contract, 116 MICH. L. REV. ONLINE 78, 85-90 (2018).
6.
In fact, President Trump proposed many of these ideas to Congress in his 2018 State of the
Union Address, although most of them have not gone anywhere. See President Donald J. Trump, State of
the Union Address (Jan. 30, 2018), http://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-jtrumps-state-union-address/. The tax incentives for investment in “Opportunity Zones,” i.e., overlooked
rural and urban areas, included in the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act are an exception. See Patrick Sisson, How
Opportunity Zones Could Become a Big Catalyst for Inner-City Development, CURBED (Apr. 12, 2018),
http://www.curbed.com/2018/4/12/17227124/investment-opportunity-zones-economic-development.
7.
See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Presidential Control over International
Law, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1201 (2018) (describing the increasing tendency of presidents to engage in
unilateral policymaking in the realm of international law).
8.
For discussion and criticism of this consensus, see, for example, Timothy Meyer, Saving the
Political Consensus in Favor of Free Trade, 70 VAND. L. REV. 985 (2017); Gregory Shaffer, Retooling
Trade Agreements for Social Inclusion, 2019 UNIV. ILL. L. REV. 1 (forthcoming Jan. 2019) (available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=3217392).
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declined to take forceful steps to address the distributional issues exacerbated by
trade liberalization. The president, on the other hand, has substantial delegated
authority over international trade policy and faces few obstacles to decisive
action. It was only a matter of time before the country elected a president who
would want to redistribute to the losers from trade distribution and who would
rely on his international trade authority to do so.
I.

THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM AND ITS SHORTCOMINGS

For years, the conventional view among policy elites in both the
Democratic and Republican parties was that if trade liberalization didn’t make
everyone better off, it could at least provide the means for doing so. As Gregory
Shaffer has described, the policy establishment danced a trade two-step.9 First,
“countries sign international trade agreements to combat protectionist pressures
and thereby mutually enhance the size of the national economic pie.”10 Second,
recognizing that trade liberalization creates both winners and losers, countries
use domestic policy to provide assistance to those who lose out from trade
liberalization.11 This approach was thought to promote efficiency by allowing
the economic pie to be as large as possible before government turned to the task
of distributing it.12
This two-step provided the intellectual and policy justification for
countries, including the United States, to make trade agreements without
worrying too much about those who would lose from those agreements. Thus,
elites on both sides of the political spectrum pushed through trade agreements
that while deferring contentious fights over distribution. This deferral does not
mean, of course, that trade agreements were or are distributionally neutral. They
are not. Industries spend a great deal of time and money lobbying their
governments to ensure that the wealth created by trade agreements flows to them
in the first instance. The intellectual property rules in trade agreements offer the
classic example. The recent United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement
(“NAFTA 2018”), for instance, requires countries to extend copyright
protections by 20 additional years and extends data protection for pharmaceutical
companies an extra two years, a key protection against generic drugs.13
But, historically, those dancing the trade two-step could only get through
the first step before tripping over themselves. Put differently, redistribution on
the scale required to address trade-exacerbated inequality never occurred.14 The
Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program, the primary vehicle for
addressing trade adjustment concerns in the United States, illustrates why.

9.
10.
11.
12.

Shaffer, supra note 8 (manuscript at 2-3).
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., Paul R. Krugman & Maurice Obstfeld, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS: THEORY
AND POLICY 216-17 (7th ed. 2005).
13. United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement, ch. 20, arts. 20.F.13, 20.H.7, Sept. 30, 2018, OFF.
U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, http://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/united-statesmexico-canada-agreement/united-states-mexico (ratification pending).
14. See Meyer, supra note 8, at 1008-11.
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President Kennedy proposed TAA in 1962 as part of a plan to dramatically
expand trade liberalization. He argued that trade liberalization, while good for
the country, would hurt certain sectors and workers, and that the country owed
those sectors and workers assistance in adapting to new economic realities.15 But
TAA, which Congress created when it authorized what became known as the
Kennedy Round of multilateral trade negotiations, was stillborn. Claimants had
such difficulty establishing that they met the eligibility conditions that the first
successful claimant did not come along until 1969.16 Since then, TAA has been
a political football, often starved for funding, occasionally lapsing entirely, and
generally inadequate to help those communities that actually need it.17
This state of affairs has structural roots, which help explain why a president
might use tariff increases as a form of redistribution. Consider the misalignment
between how the federal government handles trade liberalization and trade
adjustment.18 Trade liberalization commitments are usually enshrined in
international agreements, indefinite in length, and negotiated and implemented
by the executive branch, which faces considerably lower impediments to action
than Congress.19 Enshrining trade liberalization commitments in international
agreements creates a set of international mechanisms—including diplomacy,
formal dispute resolution, reputational concerns, and potentially sanctions—that
encourage compliance. Moreover, modern trade agreements tend not to have
defined limits on their duration, meaning that liberalization commitments never
sunset.20 Finally, trade negotiations and implementation are handled almost
entirely by the executive branch. Although Congress approves trade agreements,
it has done so primarily on the basis of an up-or-down vote since 1974,
essentially allowing the executive to make Congress a take-it-or-leave-it offer.21
In approving the agreement, Congress delegates to the president the authority to
implement it domestically through proclamations and regulations, and
supplements the president’s authority—based on his constitutional authority
over foreign affairs—to implement the agreement internationally through
diplomacy.22

15. Special Message to the Congress on Foreign Trade Policy (Jan. 25, 1962), in 2 PUB. PAPERS
68, 76 (1963) (“When considerations of national policy make it desirable to avoid higher tariffs, those
injured by that competition should not be required to bear the full brunt of the impact. Rather, the burden
of economic adjustment should be borne in part by the Federal Government.”).
16. Ethan Kapstein, Trade Liberalization and the Politics of Trade Adjustment Assistance, 137
INT’L LAB. REV. 501, 508 (1998).
17. See Garcia & Meyer, supra note 5, at 85-87.
18. See Timothy Meyer, Misaligned Lawmaking (Aug. 8, 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with author).
19. Id. at 25-26.
20. NAFTA 2018, if approved by Congress, could mark a departure from this norm. United
States-Mexico-Canada Agreement, supra note 13, ch. 34, art. 34.7.
21. Trade Act of 1974 § 151, 19 U.S.C. § 2191 (2012) (describing fast track procedures). The
U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement, which was not passed under fast-track procedures, is the exception.
See Lael Brainard & Hal Shapiro, Fast Track Trade Promotion Authority, BROOKINGS INST. 4 (Dec.
2001), http://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/pb91.pdf.
22. See, e.g., Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Implementation
Act §§ 103-6, 201, 19 U.S.C. §§ 4013-4016, 4031 (2012); United States-Korea Free Trade Agreement
Implementation Act §§ 103-6, 201, 19 U.S.C. § 3805 note (2012).
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Trade adjustment policies are almost completely the opposite. They are
entirely a function of domestic law, authorization for such programs sunsets after
a few years, and the programs require constant reauthorization by Congress—a
body institutionally incapable of decisive action and for the last several decades
politically inclined to shrink the size of government.23 Indeed, Congress may not
constitutionally be able to delegate authority over appropriations,24 meaning it
must hold on to trade adjustment policies.
Because Congress is less likely to act, proponents of trade adjustment
policies face an uphill battle. Not surprisingly, trade adjustment policies tend to
receive significant attention from Congress only when additional trade
liberalization commitments are being considered.25 Since the continuation of
trade liberalization commitments is not usually on the bargaining table, there is
no reason for trade liberalization proponents in Congress to offer major
concessions to proponents of trade adjustment policies. Consequently, trade
adjustment policies are chronically undersupplied relative to trade liberalization
commitments.26
In 2011, for instance, Congress considered approval of new trade
agreements with Colombia, Panama, and South Korea. But much more
significant trade agreements, like the WTO agreements and NAFTA 1994,
would have continued no matter the fate of those new agreements. This fact
created a mismatch between trade liberalization’s proponents (who had already
secured most of their policy gains in other agreements) and trade adjustment
proponents (who fought to extend and fund their program in its entirety). The
result was the trade adjustment proponents managed to secure only a partial
restoration of funding for TAA, and only for a two-year period.27
II.

THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY AND REDISTRIBUTION

Congress’s failure to address trade-related distributional concerns created
an opening for presidential candidates to run on a platform of doing what
Congress did not.28 In the 2016 election, President Trump ran on a campaign of

23. Meyer, supra note 18, at 26-29. To be sure, the executive branch does the actual
implementation of trade adjustment assistance, just as it implements all federal law. The point is merely
that implementation of trade adjustment assistance, unlike trade liberalization, requires returning to
Congress periodically.
24. Kate Stith, Congress’ Power of the Purse, 97 YALE L.J. 1343, 1349 (1988) (“Since
legislative appropriations power is rooted in article I, section 8, we may infer that a primary significance
of the appropriations clause in section 9 lies in what it takes away from Congress: the option not to require
legislative appropriations prior to expenditure. If the Constitution thus strictly forbids ‘executive
appropriation’ of public funds, the exercise by Congress of its power of the purse is a structural
imperative.” (footnote omitted)).
25. See Meyer, supra note 18, at 25-29.
26. Id.
27. BENJAMIN COLLINS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44153, TRADE ADJUSTMENT ASSISTANCE
FOR WORKERS AND THE TAA REAUTHORIZATION ACT OF 2015 13 (2018).
28. While “headline” unemployment remains low in manufacturing-rich Midwestern states by
historic standards, that number fails to capture either the number of people who have given up seeking
work or the extraordinary wage stagnation suffered by those still employed. See, e.g., Ernie Tedeschi,
Unemployment Looks Like 2000 Again. But Wage Growth Doesn’t, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 22, 2018),
http://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/22/upshot/mystery-slow-wage-growth-econony.html.
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bringing jobs back to places like Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and
Wisconsin.29 Having promised those states relief, President Trump looked for
the authority to grant it. But, as noted above, the president does not have the
authority to appropriate funds. Instead, the president has authority to redistribute
through the creation of trade barriers, most notably tariffs.30
The Constitution grants Congress the “Power To lay and collect Taxes,
Duties, Imposts and Excises” and “To regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations.”31 The president has no similar grant of substantive authority over
economic policy, international or domestic. Consequently, international trade
policy differs substantially from other foreign affairs issues, such as war powers,
where the president shares constitutional authority with Congress. Where
international trade policy is concerned, the president’s authority is almost
entirely statutory.32
But this statutory authority is extensive. Section 232 of the Trade
Expansion Act of 1962 allows the president to take any “action” to “adjust the
imports” of any product he deems a threat to national security.33 Section 232’s
definition of “national security” is sui generis—so broad, including not only
national defense but also any consideration related to the national economy, as
to render it virtually limitless.34 Section 232 is a blank check in the hands of a
president looking to raise tariffs. President Trump has used Section 232 to
impose 25% tariffs on 157 different kinds of steel products, as well as a 10%
tariff on aluminum imports. On August 10, 2018, he announced by tweet that
would double the tariffs on Turkey alone, apparently in response to Turkey’s
refusal to release an American pastor it was holding.35 At present, the
administration is considering “national security” tariffs on automobiles and auto

29. Nor was President Trump alone. Senator Bernie Sanders, a candidate for the Democratic
nomination, similarly campaigned against the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the then-pending U.S. trade
agreement, and more generally against inequality exacerbated by trade liberalization. See Bernie Sanders,
So-Called ‘Free Trade’ Policies Hurt U.S. Workers Every Time We Pass Them, GUARDIAN (Apr. 29,
2015), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/apr/29/so-called-free-trade-policies-hurt-usworkers-every-time-we-pass-them.
30. The president has used his delegated authority to roll back a variety of regulations, such as
environmental regulations or rules on workplace safety, which he views as burdening businesses. See
Marissa Horn, 26 Environmental Rules Being Rolled Back in the Trump Era, BNA (July 12, 2018),
http://www.bna.com/26-environmental-rules-n73014477330/; Ian Kullgren, Trump Rolls Back Worker
Safety Rules, POLITICO (Sept. 3, 2018), http://www.politico.com/story/2018/09/03/trumps-worker-safetyregulations-protections-unions-806008. These regulatory actions can be viewed as redistribution,
reallocating wealth from those protected by the repealed regulations to the businesses that no longer must
comply. Although using regulation as a form of redistribution has a long history, see Richard A. Posner,
Taxation by Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 22 (1971) and Morgan Ricks, Money as
Infrastructure, COLUM. BUS. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018), the distributional impacts of presidential
regulation, as opposed to detailed congressional legislation, remains understudied.
31. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 3.
32. As the nation’s chief diplomat, the president has constitutional responsibility for the conduct
of diplomacy, including, for instance, negotiating international economic agreements. U.S. CONST. art. II,
§ 2, cl. 2.
33. 19 U.S.C. § 1862(c)(1)(A)(ii) (2012).
34. Id. § 1862(d).
35. Jim Tankersley, Ana Swanson & Matt Phillips, Trump Hits Turkey When It’s Down,
Doubling Tariffs, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2018), http://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/10/us/politics/trumpturkey-tariffs-currency.html.
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parts.36
Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 provides another authority on which
President Trump has relied to impose 25% tariffs on $200 billion worth of
Chinese goods. Section 301 allows the president to direct the U.S. Trade
Representative to “impose duties or other import restrictions”37 if the Trade
Representative determines that “an act, policy, or practice of a foreign country is
unreasonable or discriminatory and burdens or restricts United States
commerce.”38 Like Section 232, the tariffs or other trade restrictions imposed
under Section 301 may be imposed in whatever amount and for whatever length
of the time the Trade Representative chooses, as directed by the president.39
Finally, the legislation implementing trade agreements, such as the
NAFTA Implementation Act, delegates to the president authority to proclaim
tariffs that comply with the terms of trade agreements.40 But in Section 125 of
the Trade Act of 1974, Congress has also given the president the blanket
authority to cancel any proclamation made under trade agreements for any
reason.41 As a practical matter, this legislation gives the president the unfettered
authority to set tariffs economy-wide. The implementing legislation for trade
agreements allow him to reduce tariffs in accordance with the terms of trade
agreements, while Section 125 allows him to cancel those reduced tariffs. And
since the president’s power to cancel prior tariff reductions applies to basically
all U.S. trade agreements, the president effectively has power to raise and lower
tariffs at will, for any reason. Such a broad grant of authority to raise and lower
tariffs—just taxes—may very well be an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative power by Congress.42 But until a court so holds, the breadth of the
president’s authority to raise tariffs, as well as lower them, is almost unbounded.
President Trump’s threats to terminate trade agreements like NAFTA rests on
this broad grant of authority.
Raising tariffs, as President Trump has done, redistributes wealth from
consumers of the newly taxed products, as well as foreign producers of those
products, to domestic producers (and by extension their employees) that can now
36. U.S. Department of Commerce Initiates Section 232 Investigation into Auto Imports, U.S.
DEP’T OF COMMERCE (May 23, 2018), http://www.commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2018/05/usdepartment-commerce-initiates-section-232-investigation-auto-imports.
37. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(c)(1)(B) (2012).
38. § 2411(b)(1).
39. 19 U.S.C. § 1862(c)(1)(A)(ii) (2012); 19 U.S.C. § 2411(b)(2). Other statutory provisions,
such as Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974, grant the president authority to impose tariffs or trade
restrictions as well. President Trump has, for instance, used Section 201 to impose so-called “safeguard”
tariffs on solar panels and washing machines. Section 201 does, however, cabin the president’s authority
somewhat requiring more extensive and specific findings before the president can act, and by limiting
tariffs to 4 years in duration. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2253 (2012).
40. E.g., North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act § 201(a)(1), 19 U.S.C.
§ 3331(a)(1) (2012).
41. 19 U.S.C. § 2135(b), 2135(e) (2012). Although this authority applies by its terms only to
proclamations made under the Trade Act of 1974, subsequent trade promotion statutes have made this
authority applicable to subsequent trade agreements. See Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of
1988 § 1105, 19 U.S.C. § 2904 (2012); Trade Act of 2002 § 2110(b). 19 U.S.C. § 3810 (2012).
42. Tim Meyer, Trump’s Threat to Withdraw from NAFTA May Hit a Hurdle: The U.S.
Constitution, THE CONVERSATION (Aug. 25, 2017), http://theconversation.com/trumps-threat-towithdraw-from-nafta-may-hit-a-hurdle-the-us-constitution-81444.
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sell more of their goods at higher prices. These categories do not, of course,
precisely fit President Trump’s core constituencies.43 It is easy to find data
suggesting that President Trump’s tariffs will harm consumers as well as
industries that rely on the consumption of intermediate goods to make finished
products, such as the auto manufacturing sector.44 But among Trump supporters,
public sentiment appears to support the president’s efforts, no matter how the
actual costs fall.45 And there is also data showing that the tariffs do benefit certain
industries.46 For instance, an early estimate suggested that President Trump’s
steel and aluminum tariffs would create approximately 33,000 jobs in the metal
sector.47 To be sure, the estimate also suggested that the tariffs would result in a
loss of about 179,000 jobs in other sectors, for a net loss of approximately
146,000 jobs.48 Focusing exclusively on this net figure, however, misses the
distributive function of trade policy which politicians seeking election can
exploit to their advantage.49
President Trump has also used the leverage created by his tariffs and the
threat thereof to renegotiate two trade agreements, NAFTA and the U.S.-Korea
Free Trade Agreement (KORUS). Especially with the renegotiated NAFTA, the
Trump administration focused on improving the terms of the deal for specific
constituencies, mostly certain auto workers and dairy farmers. The former stand
to benefit from new rules in NAFTA 2018 that will require more automobiles
and auto parts to be made in North America by workers making a minimum wage
of $16 an hour.50 The latter will enjoy increased market access to Canada, an
43. Trade retaliation by other countries also targets core Trump supporters, most notably
farmers in rural states that voted for Trump. Jacqueline Thomsen, Leaked Documents Show China Using
Tariffs to Target Trump’s Base: Report, THE HILL (July 3, 2018), http://thehill.com/policy/
finance/international-taxes/395356-leaked-documents-show-china-using-tariffs-to-target-trumps.
44. See, e.g., Robert Ferris, Tariffs Cost Ford $1 Billion in Profit and Hurt Sales in China,
CNBC (Sept. 26, 2018), http://www.cnbc.com/2018/09/26/tariffs-cost-ford-1-billion-in-profit-and-hurtsales-in-china.html; Sherman Robinson et al., Trump’s Proposed Auto Tariffs Would Throw U.S.
Automakers and Workers Under the Bus, PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L ECON. (May 31, 2018),
http://piie.com/blogs/trade-investment-policy-watch/trumps-proposed-auto-tariffs-would-throw-usautomakers-and; Benn Steil & Benjamin Della Rocca, Trump Steel Tariffs Could Kill up to 40,000 Auto
Jobs, Equal to Nearly One-Third of Steel Workforce, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (March 8, 2018),
http://www.cfr.org/blog/trump-steel-tariffs-could-kill-40000-auto-jobs-equal-nearly-one-third-steelworkforce (finding that a 25% steel tax will result in auto-industry job losses ranging from 18,000 to
40,000 by the end of 2019);.
45. See, e.g., Nelson D. Schwartz, Tariffs Trim a Factory’s Profit, but Loyalty to Trump
Endures, N.Y. TIMES (July 23, 2018), http://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/23/business/economy/tradefactory-trump.html; Heather Long, One Important Group Supports Trump’s Auto Tariffs, WASH. POST
(July 25, 2018), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2018/07/25/one-important-group-supportstrumps-auto-tariffs.
46. Thomas J. Gibson, Tariffs on Foreign Steel Save American Jobs, USA TODAY (Aug. 29,
2018),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2018/08/29/tariffs-foreign-steel-save-american-jobseditorials-debates/1138960002/ (reporting that U.S. Steel reopened facilities in Granite City, Illinois,
creating 800 jobs.).
47. Joseph Francois & Laura M. Baughman, Does Import Protection Save Jobs? The Estimated
Impacts of Proposed Tariffs on Imports of U.S. Steel and Aluminum, TRADE PARTNERSHIP 2 (March 5,
2018), http://tradepartnership.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/232EmploymentPolicyBrief.pdf.
48. Id.
49. See Jide O. Nzelibe, The Illusion of the Free-Trade Constitution, 19 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB.
POL’Y 1, 32-43 (2016).
50. Heather Long, U.S., Canada and Mexico Just Reached a Sweeping New NAFTA Deal.
Here’s What’s in It, WASH. POST (Oct. 1, 2018), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/
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example of trade liberalization achieved through the threat of unilateral
protection.51
Much of the rhetoric around President Trump’s tariffs glosses over this
redistributive function. Critics focus instead on the net costs and benefits to
society as a whole of trade barriers versus trade liberalization. To be sure, trade
liberalization generally creates wealth on a global scale, while trade barriers tend
to reduce it. But both actions also redistribute wealth. This redistributive
function, I argue, better explains how administrations behave in general, and how
President Trump has pursued trade policy in particular. The Trump tariffs and
renegotiated trade agreements may well drive little national economic growth;
but that, I argue, is not their purpose. They are designed to appeal to certain
narrow constituencies that President Trump promised to help.
After years of using trade liberalization to redistribute away from certain
working-class and middle-class communities, it should come as little surprise
that those communities backed a presidential candidate who promised to
redistribute wealth in their favor. And given that the president cannot directly
redistribute through fiscal programs, as Congress can, it should be little surprise
that he used the trading system, and his power to increase tariffs in particular, to
effect redistribution.52
III. A BETTER WAY
There are thus both legal and political economy reasons, as well as a deep
irony, behind President Trump’s use of tariffs to redistribute to his supporters.
Congress has substantially delegated its plenary authority over tariffs, and
international trade more generally, to the president. Presidents have used that
authority to reduce trade barriers, creating significant wealth but also
redistributing wealth in the process. Expressing a desire to help make trade more
equitable for those who put him in office, President Trump has now used the
same authority to redistribute wealth in the opposite direction. He has done so in
part because his authority to control tariff rates is the easiest means at his disposal
to redistribute.
The difficulty with redistribution through presidential tariffs is three-fold.
First, the tariffs do not seem likely to create the kind of broad economic growth
in communities harmed by trade necessary both to sustain political support for
trade liberalization and to make whole those communities whose economies
have suffered to promote the national welfare through trade liberalization. The
net benefits of trade liberalization are real and massive. Achieving a sustainable
and equitable distribution of those benefits, though, requires more fine-tuning
than can be achieved through the blunt instrument of increased tariffs on select
products.53 Second, as noted above, it is not clear that tariffs alone actually
2018/10/01/us-canada-mexico-just-reached-sweeping-new-nafta-deal-heres-whats-it/.
51. Id.
52. I do not mean to suggest, of course, that the availability of legal authority is the only reason
President Trump used tariffs. President Trump personally appears to like tariffs for other reasons as well,
including an apparent sense that trade barriers are simply too low.
53. The need to renegotiate economic rules with China, which the Trump administration is
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deliver net benefits to the groups they intend to help. President Trump’s steel
tariffs, for instance, redistribute from steel consumers, which include many
manufacturers, to steel producers. Some manufacturers (and their workers) win,
while others lose.
Third, the ad hoc use of tariffs threatens to undermine the credibility of
commitments to a long-term trade policy.54 The bipartisan consensus in favor of
trade liberalization in the post-War years has meant that international trade
policy has generally been insulated from the see-saw of presidential
administrations, in which one administration undoes the prior administration’s
actions, that characterizes areas such as environmental protection. But President
Trump’s use of tariffs could create a situation in which alternating
administrations pursue radically different trade policies. In other words, even if
President Trump’s tariffs are successful in bringing some manufacturing jobs
back, his tariffs and the gains they have supported may be undone by the next
administration. Even worse, effective trade policy of any kind depends on
coordination among countries—and coordination is difficult when one
administration refuses to honor its predecessor’s commitments.
There is a better way. Distributional issues should be married to trade
policy in a way that they currently are not. In an era in which trade agreements
set rules governing health and safety regulations, provide minimum intellectual
property rules, establish standards for digital trade that impact domestic privacy
laws, and establish minimum labor and environmental standards, the argument
that trade adjustment should remain domestic and legislative, while trade policy
should be international and executive, is no longer tenable. Whatever its value
in a world of technocrats, the trade two-step is no longer a viable institutional
design when trade policy is already being used for distributional purposes.
Instead, we must create institutional incentives to deal with trade liberalization
and trade adjustment together, in the same institutions and on the same timelines.
Doing so is the only sure way to create and sustain trade adjustment policies that
support and ensure the long-term viability of trade liberalization policies.
This alignment could be accomplished in a number of ways. Most
obviously, Congress has the ability to claw back its authority over tariffs. Indeed,
a number of bills are pending in Congress that would accomplish just that.55 They
would do so by stripping the president of his authority to proclaim tariffs under
the various statutory provisions described above. Instead, the president’s
proclamations would become recommendations to Congress, on which Congress
pushing for through its tariffs on Chinese products, could in principle deliver broad-based benefits. See
Mark Wu, The “China, Inc.” Challenge to Global Trade Governance, 57 HARV. INT’L L. J. 261 (2016).
However, that China will agree to overhaul its economic rules in response to President Trump’s tariffs is
far from certain.
54. I am not arguing against tough negotiating tactics, which, as I have written elsewhere, can
be quite effective. Rather, any use of such tactics should be embedded in a long-term strategy. See Timothy
Meyer & Ganesh Sitaraman, A Trade Policy for All, FOREIGN AFF. (June 26, 2018),
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2018-06-26/trade-policy-all.
55. Kathleen Claussen, Trade War Battles: Congress Reconsiders Its Role, LAWFARE (Aug. 5,
2018) (describing bills pending in Congress to impose fast-track procedures on different trade statutes,
such as Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act), http://www.lawfareblog.com/trade-war-battlescongress-reconsiders-its-role.
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would vote pursuant to fast-track rules.56 For instance, a bill by Senator Bob
Corker of Tennessee would require fast-track approval of “national security”
trade measures under Section 232.57 Senator Mike Lee of Utah has introduced a
bill that would apply more broadly to any “unilateral”—i.e., presidential—
change in trade barriers under a wide range of U.S. trade laws.58
Under these bills, the president would still control the agenda, but Congress
would make the ultimate decisions about trade barriers, and hence their
distributional effects. Putting the ball back in Congress’s court might push it to
examine other mechanisms at its—but not the president’s—disposal to address
the distributional issues underlying the desire to raise tariffs. Constitutionally,
these measures also solve the nondelegation problem presented by statutes that
grant wholesale authority over tariffs and foreign commerce to the president. Of
course, these bills would likely have to overcome a presidential veto to become
law. But litigation challenging the scope of the delegations of authority in trade
statutes, such as Section 232, could give the President an incentive work with
Congress on how to better allocate responsibility for trade policy.59
Sunset and review provisions, of the kind contemplated by NAFTA 2018,
provide another vehicle for reengaging Congress.60 By requiring a periodic
review of the United States’ membership in trade agreements through a process
that involves Congress, sunset or review provisions give proponents of trade
adjustment more opportunities to lobby Congress for aligning trade liberalization
and trade adjustment policies.61
At the other end of the extreme, delegating to the executive branch explicit
authority to deal with the distributional impacts of trade would also align trade
liberalization and trade adjustment. Gregory Shaffer, for instance, has argued
that Congress can authorize the executive branch to impose trade remedies for
“social dumping”—the practice of pricing imports so low, made possible by
unfair labor or environmental practices, that they cause serious injury to
domestic industries.62 Perhaps most importantly, the time has come for trade
agreements themselves to include obligations on all countries, including
developed countries, to address distributional issues directly.63 As trade
agreements have swept in topics further and further afield from traditional trade
56. The pending bills differ in how many trade statutes would be subject to the new fast track
procedures. Id.
57. S. 3013, 115th Cong. (2018).
58. S. 177, 115th Cong. (2017).
59. See Am. Inst. for Int’l Steel, Inc. v. United States, 1:18-cv-00152-CRK-JCG-GSK (Ct. Int’l
Trade filed June 27, 2018) (raising a nondelegation challenge to Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act);
see also William Mauldin, Lawsuit Challenges Trump’s Authority to Impose Tariffs, WALL ST. J. (June
27,
2018),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/lawsuit-challenges-trumps-authority-to-impose-tariffs1530104915 (describing the same).
60. United States-Mexico-Canada Act, supra note 13, ch. 34, art. 34.7.
61. The sunset and review provision of NAFTA 2018 does not directly require Congress’s
engagement, relying instead (as is usual for international agreements) on the “head of government” to
transmit a member’s wishes with respect to renewal. United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement, supra
note 13, ch. 34, art. 34.7.3. However, in the implementing legislation for NAFTA 2018, Congress has the
opportunity to mandate its involvement in this review process.
62. Shaffer, supra note 8 (manuscript at 33-42).
63. Meyer, supra note 8.
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liberalization concerns, there is no longer a case for leaving distributional issues
out of trade agreements. A Development Chapter in trade agreements,
implemented by the executive branch, would provide both reassurance to those
disaffected with our current trade policies and a concrete set of policy tools for
the government to help those individuals.
I have made the case for a Development Chapter in trade agreements
elsewhere.64 My point here is that increasing the president’s authority to respond
to trade adjustment concerns specifically, be it through a Development Chapter,
rules on social dumping, or some other mechanism, would channel the political
demand for trade adjustment policies away from destructive tariffs that rest on
outdated and overly broad statutory authority. If the 2016 election is any
indication, the consensus around the trade two-step has collapsed. Going
forward, trade liberalization and trade adjustment will have to go hand in hand.
The question is whether we will design institutions to help them work together.

64.

Id.; Garcia & Meyer, supra note 5, at 90-93.

